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DELTA LEGACIES
IN 
LAUNCH COST REDUCTION
By 
Philip W. Payne
ABSTRACT
Delta launches nave had a high success ratio. One factor has oeen 
successful field processing. Review of hard experience and study of critical 
costs, produced a test philosophy which led to development of improved methods 
and equipment. This test philosophy saw several virtues in the minimization 
of human access to flight hardware, both in and out of test.
Planning and precision were the adopted characteristics of "people performance." Automation and mechanization of test exercises and of data-taking were implemented by launch site concepting, designing, and fabricating special test equipments. These are illustrated and discussed.
The success of these methods and equipments has had time to mature in 
routine use. Evaluation indicates they made a major contribution to the 
outstanding cost effectiveness and reliability of the DELTA LAUNCH VEHICLE.
INTRODUCTION
The Delta Program began in 1959. It 
has run twenty-five fruitful years and 
launched more than 200 satellites with 
perhaps the most efficient space rocket 
serving the scientific and civilian 
community. Now the end of the Delta 
Program may be in sight. Only five 
American launches remain scheduled, three 
this year. This paper, in reporting the 
origin and ontogeny of Delta's field 
processing methods, may serve the 
operational refinement of other present or 
future programs.
BRIEF HISTORY
First launch of a Delta was May 13, 
1960. It carried an Echo passive balloon 
satellite and was unsuccessful due to a 
second stage attitude control system 
malfunction. Following a path thereafter 
of relative- success, as compared with other 
launch venicles, Delta continued through 
generations of technical growth. Under a 
very small management team which allowed it 
to be efficient, the Delta found new uses 
and customers beyond che first buy of 12 
vehicles. Goddard Space Flight Center's
Delta Project Management established a 
Delta strategy of simplicity, economy and 
progressive, but very careful, growtn. 
Largely ignored by greater movements in the 
federal machinery, the Delta persisted and 
performed. It endured, grew and provided 
service to a wide range of customers over 
many years. The last US Delta launched at 
this writing (March 1984) was number 174, 
the 40th consecutive success of the 
complete vehicle. Japan bought a transfer 
of Delta technology from McDonnell 
Douglas. All J3_ of the Japanese launch 
vehicles performed through injection 
properly. No satellite-launching rocket 
has equalled that record.
Out of the 174 multi-stage American 
Delta vehicles launched, all stages 
performed as required on 163. Eleven 
failed to carry out their mission. This 
record of reliability is high among its 
peers. The preponderance of the 11 
failures occurred in the first half of the 
program, seven in the first 86 launches.
The four failures in the last 88 launches 
have all been caused by latent flaws (structural or component failure) not 
detectable in field processing.
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This success has been due to a few 
elemental factors: (1) The basic Delta. 
hardware has been a sound product, well 
screened and tested in manufacture, of 
design as simple as possible consistent 
with its mission, and, in ruggedness, 
somewhat forgiving -- even without much 
redundancy. (2) The people of the Delta 
Program have been talented and dedicated, 
enduring and motivated -- because all 
stages of the Delta, as well as software 
and flight predictions, have been uhe 
product of one company, because the program 
organization is simple, and because 
communications therefore have always tended 
to be personal and easy. (3) Field 
operations have developed refined 
disciplines in that final arena of flight 
preparations and high-cost consequences.
Cost of the Delta has been modest, 
owing to tacit program policies: (1) To 
shun unnecessary complexity and (2) to 
avoid new developments where the 
extemporization of elements already 
perfected for other programs could be 
availed. Delta was an outgrowth of Thor 
and Vanguard. They paid its primary 
development cost. The use of available 
systems has been a Delta hallmark. For 
years the second stage engines were excess 
lunar-lander engines. The first stage main 
engines for the last 78 Deltas manufactured 
have been repackaged surplus engines from 
the Saturn I-B program. The first stage 
hydraulic system was modified to use 
"surplus 11 Saturn IV-B integrated "power 
pacs". The Delta flight computer and 
guidance system is an 
the "lunar lander backup 
system, recently further 
Delta by McDonnell Douglas to 
redundancy. It has flown successfully 
all 91 (including Japanese) of its
strapped-down
adaption of 
navigation
developed for
add!
in
flights,
In terms of payload-value delivered per 
dollar actual cost,, the Delta exceeds other 
satellite-injecting rockets. Until now STS
users have been charged token costs to 
i nduce t he i r par t i c i p ati on. Actual cost 
comparison with the Delta woulci 5e unfair
until after greater STS matoring.
In terms of Government dollars outlaid 
for development, the availability of Delta 
as an American tool has been acnieved for 
the users of the world at very low cost. 
This is because, first constructed out of 
other-developed elements, the Delta 
improvements were fully amortized on 
programs such as Thor, Vanguard, and 
Saturn.
Commercial and foreign users have been 
charged full costs of growth and 
improvement, as well as stage manufacture 
and field operations. These charges, 
undertaken and paid profitably (oecause 
they were economical), nave included 
pro-rata shares of all Delta's many 
stair-step growth developments. They have 
also included cost of all problem pursuits 
and failure investigations through all 
remedies and improvements. For many years, 
the American taxpayer has had no 
development or underwriting burden from the 
Delta. He has paid for it only when used 
as the vehicle for a Government launch. It 
should be noted that the Castor IV (3900) 
and PAM-D upgrades of the Delta's launch 
capability were the first commercial space 
launch vehicle programs. These programs 
were commercially funded by McDonnell 
Douglas with development cost recovery 
through commercial foreign sales.
A share of the cost control and 
reliability has been in the field. While 
the Delta is largely manfactured in 
Huntington Beach, California, the stacking 
and completion of the vehicle on its launch 
pad entails field assembly of over ten 
thousand components. In complexity of 
assembly, with the nine strap-on solid 
motors, their quick separation systems and 
all the thermal protection provisions that 
must go with them, the field preparation of 
Delta is equal to or greater than the 
effort required to stack and prepare any 
other expendable, multi-stage vehicle, yet 
the manpower to accomplish these tasks has 
been characteristically less than for other 
vehicles, as shown in Table -I-.
TABLE -I«
TYPICAL (1981-1982) LAUNCH TEAM PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Task
Head Count Launches/Year Complexity Figure Of Merit 
(H/C) (Total) Factor (C.F.) (LR X 1000 CF/HC)
Delta 227
Titan 708
Atlas & Centaur 485
9
7
6
1
0.90
0.8
39 - 6 
8.9 
9.9
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One of the reasons for Delta 
reliability at modest cost has been 
improvements in field preparation. These 
improvements were not random but were 
consciously introduced based on a study of 
hard experiences in our industry. They 
were designed and introduced in the early 
'70s as a group of coherent facets intended 
to provide a unified solution to many 
problems of launch operations in the field, 
from preventing flight failure, damage and 
injury, to avoiding excessive expenditures 
of cost and time. They were aimed at 
mission success at moderate price.
A Change From Early Beginnings
First launches of long distance 
vehicles were tests of weapons. While 
success was urgently desired, correct 
performance by 65% of the missions was 
acceptable. The field effort was 
developmental. The value at risk was 
little more than that of the launch 
vehicle. However, in the launching of 
satellites to orbit, the values of 
spacecraft exceeded values of the launch 
vehicles, sometimes by an order of 
magnitude. Failure was dear and painful. 
It was the anguish of early hard 
experiences that led to formulation of a 
field philosophy within the McDonnell 
Douglas launch crews. This formulation was 
particularly catalyzed by the Vandenberg 
AFB loss of the NASA Thor Agena for 
Nimbus-B, where the payload estimated cost 
was about $200 million in 1968 dollars and 
that of the first stage vehicle which 
caused the failure less than a million. 
Other experiences were studied. These 
experiences were not limited to Delta but 
included those known from Thor, Atlas, 
Centaur, Titan, Vanguard, Navajo, Agena, 
and other rockets.
A field improvement study was set in 
"motion by McDonnell Douglas Field Site 
Management, the objective was to determine 
common causes for problems and from them, 
opportunities for improving field 
operations. For the study, done by field 
operations supervisors, field-preventable 
or field-caused flight or static test 
failures were the most dramatic lessons.
In 1957, the first launch of a Thor 
detonated on liftoff due to contamination. 
In 1958, at Sacramento Field Test Station 
in California, a test of a Thor liquid 
oxygen transfer sled killed three worxers 
and severely injured others, owing to 
nylon in LOX and aggravated by poor test 
and personnel control. A Delta solid motor 
accident at Cape Canaveral in 1964 killed 
three workers, a result of static 
discharge. In May of 1968, the Nimbus-B 
mission from Vandenberg was lost because of
field misinstallation of a rate gyro. That 
gyro was installed misclocked, and an 
inconclusive test, intended to find such a 
problem, did not. Validity of the test 
itself had not been tested out was 
assumed. In October 1971 Delta 86 was lost 
because of a vent valve leak on the second 
stage that could have been detected on the 
launch pad. Other problems on other 
programs studied included the inter-aqency 
communications lack whicn led to the 
Gemini/Agena mission failure known as "The 
Angry Alligator," and the explosion of the 
"T-Bird" (first test vehicle of the Saturn 
S-II) which was destroyed on the 
Mississippi test stand through 
communication error and assumption 
(pressurizing main tanks with a 
disconnected pressure transducer).
Other less dramatic problem aspects of 
the then Douglas Company field work were 
studied for factors of delay, hazards and 
expense.
It was learned that on Thor and Delta 
launch complexes, as exist in all 
organizations, there were opportunities for 
improvement. Errors had been introduced 
through the replacement of comoonents for 
preventive maintenance. A trial policy 
change was made to halt much of this 
prescheduled replacement. It was seen that 
more manhours had been consumed in 
correction of misinstallations than was 
saved by this maintenance, that components 
left in place continued working well long 
after expiry of their arbitrary maintenance 
schedules. Not removing them not only 
saved the replacement and retest efforts, 
but avoided system disruptions, 
possibilities of contamination and many 
scheduling headaches. Risks of failure 
were evaluated component by component.
From study results most scheduled 
maintenance was stopped; systems were in 
constant use and therefore of known 
condition. "Fix it when it breaks" was 
adopted as a final policy with eminent 
success.
The that 
work
study also revealed elluu
departments, though trying to  
together, used paper forms unshared by 
other departments. Team personnel of other 
departments who needed to be involved had 
no access to one another's paper and were 
therefore uninformed. From this 
observation came the policy of using a 
single, all-department documentation 
system, accountable for all launch 
processing actions and used by, and 
contributed to, by all departments. This 
became known as the LPD (Launch Processing 
Document), Its use was developed into a 
highly refined but straightforward
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operating system, computer maintained, and 
tracked for completion of each test 
requirement and each installation. See 
Figure -1-.
A study of main causes of manhours 
consumed at the launch sites revealed three 
primary areas where expenditure of manhours 
was high but avoidable: largest was the 
domain of retest and re-exercise owing to 
test data indicating anomalies or system 
performance errors . Unfortunately these 
were found to be so frequent and were so 
habitually resolved to be "no problem" by 
repetitive further testing, that they were 
interpreted not as failures but as system 
"uncertainties." Tabulations of tests and 
efforts over a number of Thor and Delta 
launches at Vandenberg AFB showed a high 
incidence of "uncertainty" developing in 
tested systems owing to questionable data 
taken during original or subsequent 
testing. Many test repeats studied did not 
indicate a high rate of actual system or 
component failure. It had been the 
practice to retest many times on the 
understanding that actual mechanism 
problems do not come and go, but -- once 
there -- can be repeated and understood. 
This was a "crude confidence" approach. It 
was observed that multiple tests tend to be 
done with increasingly systematic care. 
When a data-taking problem occurred, 
multiple test was the method used to 
distinguish this from a real system problem 
and to gain system confidence. This 
method, once reviewed in perspective, was 
considered poor in contrast to avoidance of 
bad data-taking in the first place.
Tne study showed a very large 
proportion of all test uncertainties were 
due to improper data, resulting from 
careless performance, poor human 
observation, or reliance on verbal 
reporting without written follow-up.
Causes were often:
  
Lack of complete readiness for the 
tests, leading to carelessness.
Lack of 
understanding.
thorough team
t Poor initial plan or a late change 
to the plan leading to confusion, 
performance errors, or data-taking 
methods that were unsystematic.
From this observation arose policies to:
  
Design and build test equipment 
which will take data in recorded
fashion, with greater 
mechanization, and with less 
chance for operator error. These 
equipments came into being and 
formed a major part of the Delta 
Launch Sites culture. Examples 
are discussed in this paper.
Develop rigorously studied and 
prepared procedures, refined by 
test and use.
Adhere to these tightly on launch 
after launch, changing only with 
strong reason and great care.
Increase attention to test and 
operation management such that a 
test conductor and countdown 
format is used on essentially all 
vehicle operations.
Second largest area of reducible 
manhour consumption was the domain of 
retesting done to give a currency to system 
confidence. Since launch delays for 
reasons otner than the readiness of the 
rocket often occurred, they were considered 
"normal." The "health" or launch-readiness 
of systems was known to decay (as testified 
by problems found in these retests). 
Testing was therefore planned on a 
repeating and periodic basis. The study 
perused past records for causes of 
readiness decay where it actually had been 
found.Some decay of tested condition was 
noted due to moisture intrusion in 
circuits. None was found due to aging of 
soft goods. None was found due to 
corrosion or other chemical change (in the 
short times involved). Only one 
substantial factor was found to justify the 
erosion of confidence in tested readiness: 
Human access.
Access to tested flight hardware had 
not customarily been prevented. Intrusions 
were numerous and, taken one by one, each 
generally carried good reason. Access was 
informal in opening flight boxes, entering 
ground terminal boards, breaking into gas 
supplies, propellant lines, etc. 
Individually, each action generally was 
driven by a well-meaning sponsor interested 
in rechecking a set of terminators or in 
incorporating a later and "better" 
modification. But as a whole, such access 
was destructive.
Also there was casual access -- human 
presence which focused on one objective in 
one system while accidentaly disturbing 
another; wrong placing of a foot or hand, a 
dropped wire strand or a pocket pencil.
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The study concluded that access 
invalidation of tests could be avoided by:
  Exclusion of access where possible.
  Rigorously controlling access to 
tested systems, and inserting 
special care where sucn access was 
imperative.
  Implementing policies to mandate 
system closure after test.
These actions were taken. Periodic 
repeating test were largely dropped.
and
The third area of manhour expenditure 
found to be reducible was: "Habitual 
Testing." This is testing for which the 
reason -- once clear to someone -- is no 
longer Known. Or if it is known, 
represents a refragmentation of an 
integrated system into components. This is 
a natural trend where a test engineering 
department is divided into disciplines. In 
the testing studied, a notable example was 
seen: the internal disconnect of the 
guidance system from the hydraulic system. 
The hydraulic engineers had always required 
the VATS (Valve Actuator Test Set) to be 
employed to drive the hydraulic system to 
full stops. The reason, when asked, was to 
assure the main engine did not strike the 
legs of the launch mount. However the 
electrical disconnecting had accounted for 
numerous severe damages to the flight 
control electronics, due to uncoordinated 
turn-on in the unloaded (disconnected) 
condition.
This example of "Habitual Testing" was 
averted' by cutting away launch mount legs 
for clearance to remove all probability of 
engine contact. The break-in to this 
tested system was no longer done 
routinely. Flight vehicle hydraulic 
testing was accomplished only through 
flight electronics. Damage to the flight 
controller ceased.
From this study of manhour consumption 
came a realization that testing by somewhat 
blind, habitual repetition of what had been 
done earlier led to inappropriate testing. 
Such testing, as conditions changed in the 
development of a program and its flight 
hardware, may no longer be warranted 
without some vehicle of oetter analytical 
perspective.
The idea of an 
requirements" came.
aostract of "testing 
For convenience, this
was divided into two general listings:
t Those tests of specific systems 
(and specific components, where 
necessary) needed late (at the
launch site) oy virtue of their 
component physical nature. These 
features require test after 
vehicle emplacement on the launch 
pad to assure specific performance 
characteristics have remained.
  Those tests and operations which 
our experience has taught are 
prudent and necessary for 
contingency reasons or which are 
required on a Government range. 
These are as much a listing of 
what to avoid as what to do.
On the Delta Program, two documents 
resulted, the former a TRD (Test 
Requirements Document) and the latter an 
ORD (Operating Requirements Document).
Finally the study brought forth the 
realization that much time and labor was 
expended due to error-driven flight 
equipment damage and its subsequent repair, 
replacement, and retest. This was 
particularly caused by test set-up damage. 
It occurred on electrical connectors (bent 
pins) and in clean systems 
(contamination). Testing had traditionally 
been done with set up and tear down 
preceding and following each test. This 
meant much set up traffic and much damage. 
From this realization sprang a feature of 
the field philosophy which thereafter 
shaped the development of new test 
equipment and a simpler test flow. It had 
the objective of making a single hookup of 
ground test systems to a launch venicle and 
having just a single removal.
The study showed need for all 
operations to be under direction of a 
senior real time, system-wise, 
multi-disciplined test authority. The real 
time Test Conductor over all agencies was 
needed to keep operations technically and 
operationally compatible. His necessary 
functions included the promulgation of 
understanding between all active parties on 
a single launch pad. This is a function of 
communications management. To do it 
properly, operations must be conducted on a 
communications net. By acting as the 
"Blind Man" on the net the "TC" can induce 
team members to verbalize events, thus 
promoting a wide distribution of team 
understanding.
Other vital outcomes were also arrived 
at for sound reasons, as outlined in the 
fie^ philosophy to which these inquiries 
gave rise:
Plan testing and operations 
detai1 , in advance.
in
Control test 
hierarchically.
operations
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Maintain ground equipment through 
necessary repairs discovered in 
frequent use rather than through 
extensive replacements in a 
maintenance program.
Include all departments in a
single plan. Let them operate as
a team, not as factions.
and testMechanize tests 
equipments to:
. Reduce operator variability 
. Reduce data judgement error 
. Increase data validity.
Restrict and control access to 
tested hardware, botn ground and 
flight.
Divide launch site processing into
domains:
. Assembly of rocket
. Test preparation
. Systems testing
. Test systems removal
. Flight preparation
. Launch countdown.
Organize work paper to be:
. A coherent plan.
. Used and understood by all
departments. 
. Best thought inputs of all
departments. 
* Sequenced, detailed, step
step instruction, organized
timeliness so that details 
when to be used,given 
than "boilerplate 1
by 
in 
are
rather 
to beas 
unheeded.
. Devoid of vague generalities 
that can be someone's excuse 
that foretnought and 
instructions are contained 
whi le they may not be 
effectively contained.
. Graphically i11u s trated.
. Va 1 i d at ed1 point by po i nt, 
progressively.
. Au g me in t ed" w i t h interpretive 
notes.
. A record of all that has 
- happened.
. Evaluated by engineers and 
managers in later making the 
case for readiness to launch.
Do a11 operations accord i ng to
coordi mated, de1i berated plan. 
Where plan needs change (due to 
i n ad e q u. acy, c h a n g i n g condition s » 
malfunction or troubleshooting), 
re plan.
Do not shortcut plan for haste or 
hurry; remember the high value of 
the hardware you handle. Shortest 
course is a studied course.
maintain highest 
crew performance in
t Develop and 
disciplines of 
terms of: 
. Precision
. Observation and report 
. Communication.
  Germinate and cultivate a special 
anomaly handling culture: any 
single player can report an 
anomaly. No single player can 
adjudicate an anomaly. Unexpected 
observations are (1) registered, 
(2) developed for full factual 
substance, (3) widely 
communicated, (4) variously judged 
by all concerned agents and 
groups, and (5) accepted only in 
concensus.
Implementation of these study results 
into the Delta field processing involved 
transition into new people disciplines, new 
paper systems and thecreationof new 
precision equTpments.
New families of 
necessary to carry out 
objectives of reducing:
equipment were 
the philosophical
Manpower costs
Motion and time to/of test
Misperformances
Mis-taking of data
Unintended abuse to flight
hardware.
These equipments had to be designed. 
They were conceived by field personnel and 
largely designed in the field (to use to 
best advantage the knowledge of systems and 
of test problems held by the field 
engineers). This tasK also provided mind 
and talent honing challenges to the field 
engineers while at the same time avoiding 
costs by more productive utilization of 
time between tests. Similarly, these 
equipments were largely built in the field 
to utilize the talents of the field 
technicians and minimize cost.
The design factors to be achieved 
within the limits of time and with little 
additional money were:
  Capability to be connected once in 
the launch campaign.
Capability to operate 
programmed, hands-off mode.
in
Capability to take recorded data.
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  Capability to take data remotely 
on high-hazard systems, therefore 
make possible the thorough testing 
of these systems witnout undue 
exposure of personnel.
  When hazardous systems require 
human presence, to provide full 
and best protection.
  Additional to the more proficient 
taking of data was the design 
objective of better assimilation 
of data taken.
Resulting were the following Launch 
Site testing and operating systems:
DOTS: The Delta Ordnance Test System was 
appropriately the first of the ground 
equipment improvements because the Delta is 
a heavy user of ordnance-activated devices 
and much data difficulty had been 
encountered in assuring all ordnance firing 
commands were emanating on time and in 
correct magnitude from the vehicle to the 
several electro-explosive devices (EED's). 
The DOTS replaced a collage of test devices 
which used flashbulbs and circuit oreakers 
without timing or recorders; they were for 
perceiving electrical firing commands at 
ordnance device connectors . The old 
systems used short cables to connect to the 
three stages separately. Tney were coupled 
before each test and removed promptly 
afterward. This had oeen necessary because 
Delta gantries were open. Equipments could 
not reasonably be left exposed to weather 
for extended periods.
An indoor central console, Figure -2-, 
was used with "octopus cables" reaching to 
every ordnance connector on the 3-stage 
vehicle. Signal occurrences was thereafter 
recorded with respect to range timing. 
Further, the intensity and duration of the 
bridge wire currents were monitored for 
adequacy by special modules mounted in the 
load contact boxes (Figure -3-) and were 
limited such that errant values could not 
injure launch venicle wiring. This 
monitoring and limiting was accomplished oy 
ordnance simulator modules adapted from 
surplus gear of the Saturn Program and 
built into DOTS.
In pre-DOTS times, another variety of 
data had been perceived and reported by a 
most imprecise means. The second stage 
attitude control cold gas jets were noted 
to "fire" oy men listening nearby. Timing 
was absent or inaccurate. The certainty of 
which jets fired when, often dissolved in 
confusion and differences of opinion.
Small protective assemblies being otherwise 
needed to protect the fragile jet nozzles,
the RACS monitors, Figure -5-, were devised 
to convert gas puffs into electrical 
signals. In addition they protected 
nozzles. Receptor Venturis were connected 
to inexpensive bellows switches with tygon 
tubing. Their switch closures were then 
registered along with ordnance signals on 
the DOTS chart recorders.
The DOTS was able to bring test 
equipments indoors by virtue of a 
specially-ouilt gantry room. That this 
system could then remain connected to the 
launch vehicle during the entire launcn 
testing period of each rocket's launch 
campaign eliminated most connect/disconnect 
damage. Reduction of ordnance-firing and 
jet-firing data to timed record eliminated 
much need for retesting.
FLOPI: The number of Delta retests 
required by misoperation during the largest 
of all tests, the multi-stage flight 
simulation, was exorbitant. Manhours and 
schedule days were wasted. Most often 
miscued was the pulling of the "liftoff 
pins." These pins are part of the launch 
mount and actuate vehicle switches as they 
leave their vehicle nacelles at liftoff. 
They signal the vehicle systems to perform 
the flight program. There are two, on 
opposite sides of the rocket base plane and 
are pulled, hopefully, on the right second 
by two independent technicians listening to 
a count. One or both were often 
mis-timed. FLOPI (Flight Lifoff Pin 
Initiator) implemented a 
blockhouse-originated signal to pull the 
pins using pneumatic actuators. The 
resultant precision virtually suspended 
this frequent cause for retest.
OCAT: The possession of the DOTS gave rise 
to a new opportunity to eliminate another 
source of time-consuming labor, the 
detailed pin-to-pin measurement of stray 
voltage on the ordnance circuits of the 
vehicle at the time of final ordnance 
connection. One of the development efforts 
of the Delta Launch Team had been the 
shortening of the long countdown on launch 
day. A task of that day has always been 
the arming of the strap-on solid motors.
To accomplish this quickly required arming 
through one large connector rather than at 
the many individual detonator points, as 
traditional. However, it was our safety 
policy - in pre-connection measuring to 
assure no stray voltage present on ordnance 
circuits - to measure not only the absence 
of spurious voltage across the wires 
leading to each oridge wire, but also to 
measure from every pin In each connector to 
every other pin and to the shell of each 
connector. In small, two or four-wire 
connectors, this is a manageable tasK for
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manual measurements. In connectors of 
large size, the permutations of measurement 
cause the task to grow enormously. A 
computer or other automation medium was 
needed. Thus a major stimulus for 
developing OCAT was this need to arm solid 
motors out of a single, large connector.
The computer driven measurement system 
which became known as OCAT was, in 1972, 
merely an adaptation of the HP2100 ground 
resident computer newly supplied to the 
launch locations to interface with the 
on-board flight computer. This computer 
was first flown on Delta in July 1972. 
OCAT extended the use of the HP2100 
computer in tne blockhouse to work througn 
the DOTS (which was already normally 
connected most of the time to every 
ordnance circuit on the rocket). The 
ground computer's time free from its 
occasional use in commanding the on-board 
computer, was not greatly impacted by new 
employment. OCAT was implemented by adding 
late technology wire wrap circuitry, arrays 
of reed relays, and digital voltmeters to 
the DOTS. Tnis accommodated computer 
access and provided switching capability to 
each of tne DOTS rocket ordnance circuits. 
By -this means the blockhouse computer 
became able to address all vehicle ordnance 
circuits and to switch any two to a digital 
voltmeter system located near the 
rocket-side within the DOTS connection 
boxes. With programming, OCAT was then 
able to profile in rapid sequence all 
ordnance circuits on the rocket for 
resistance, isolation, and stray voltage. 
The judging of the measurements was also 
programmed so that, while all results were 
printed out for human perusal, all 
unsatisfactory readings were flagged. OCAT 
also provided such capability to the main 
solid motor initiation and separation 
connector. By means of OCAT it became 
possible thereafter to accomplish all 
pretest, post-test and pre-arming surveys 
of the condition and health of all ordnance 
firing circuits promptly, with hign 
confidence, few delays, and with a minimum 
of manpower. By the incorporation of 
continuous monitor and alarm circuits, it 
also became possible to watcn for the 
presence of any significant stray voltage 
continuously and to record any such voltage 
for later time correlation with passing 
electrical storms, work access, or other 
events.
OCAT reduced the the amount of time 
required to arm the launch vehicle from 
expenditure of many hours, by many 
technicians, to the spending of minutes by 
a few. It made many fewer errors and 
produced more accurate data, all with a net 
reduction of hazard exposure.
EEDAT: Although redundancy has been used 
in the Delta ordnance system design, 
failure of electro-explosive devices could 
cause mission failure. Therefore, 
confirmation of EED integrity as late as 
possible oefore installation is an 
important action for mission success. The 
traditional method of handling and testing 
EED's sucn as explosive oolts, pyrotechnic 
cable cutters and small actuation rockets 
involved days of hands-on testing. Men 
travelled to ordnance bunkers and employed 
Alinco meters, test leads, and pin sleeves 
to measure painstakingly -- and at some 
hazard -- the continuity and resistance of 
all the oridge wires in all the EED's, both 
primaries and spares. For multi-stage 
Delta, ordnance checKout could take as long 
as five days. Many man days were consumed 
per mission in his activity. Even thVn, 
the testing was necessarily completed long 
before installation. Retesting in cases of 
abort were equally time consuming. Despite 
care and proficiency, there were errors and 
uncertainties.
The EEDAT (Electro-explosive Device 
Automatic Tester) converted this chore to 
systematic good results. EEDAT was 
conceived as the marriage of an ordnance 
safety system to the computer driven 
measurement and readout system of OCAT. 
Actually they were a symbiotic development, 
as the germ ideas of each affected the 
final outcome of both. The ordnance safety 
was provided by designing new ordnance 
carrying cases (Figure -6-). These were 
"Haliburton cases" fitted with stout 
aluminum/steel manifolds to hold sets of 
ordnance safely. Even if the case is hand 
neld, and all ordnance devices detonate 
simultaneously, the manifold contains and 
safely bleeds down resultant pressures. 
The design was proven by test. A cable 
harness inside the case is made to connect 
to each of the EED's and to an external 
connector on the surface of the case. 
During all handling except actual device 
testing, this external connector is 
"shorted" with a faraday cap. In routine 
use, manifolded cases are provided for a 
complete ship-set of EED's plus spares. 
EED's are only inspected physically, then 
loaded into the manifolds by screwing into 
the ports. This occurs at the ordnance 
storage bunker. Thereafter the ordnance 
can be safely carried and even stored at 
the rocket-side until ready for testing.
The coupling of tne EEDAT box to the 
computer-driven readout system (Figure -7-) 
involved only the addition of a 
current-limited signal injection feature 
and simple cable connection to the OCAT 
system. A software program was provided to 
the blockhouse computer for driving this 
system. By this means, small currents are
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sent in succession through each of the EED 
bridge wires. The resulting infinitesimal 
voltage drops across the bridge wires are 
measured to ascertain bridge wire 
resistance. The automatic measurement, 
oerformed in an instant, immediately 
precedes installation of explosive devices 
in the rocket. By means of EEDAT the 
earlier logistics problems surrounding the 
handling of ordnance were eliminated with 
added safety and with greater validity of 
checkout of each EED at the time of 
installation. After a decade of use, EEDAT 
has made thousands of measurements through 
the bridge wires of live ordnance without 
an instance of dudding or detonation.
RLE: Leak detection in lightweight flight 
systems has long been the predicate of 
field problems. Design margins in such 
systems are often low for purposes of 
weight conservation, 1.2 to 1.4 
Durst-over-operating pressures being 
common. Such systems cannot be safely 
approached when fully pressurized. Leak 
detection by traditional methods of Dubble 
solution and observation must be done at 
much lower pressures. For systems which 
must remain in space without body moments 
or losses from gas leaks, a complete and 
accurate leak check is mandatory. Leak 
check oy the decay method was long the only 
available means to assure leak tightness of 
such systems. This was time consuming and 
often produced inexact results during the 
hours of diurnal temperature variation. 
Also, the method was only valid if there 
were no leaks. If leaks were present, it 
was impossible to locate them at full 
pressure. If they were the type leaks 
which only appear at high pressure, then 
the location and repair became an entire 
impossiblity. These facts, plus the loss 
of Delta 86 because of a small leak on the 
second stage, were the stimuli for the 
invention and development of the RLE 
(Remote Leak Evaluator) sytem.
Conceived and designed by launch site 
engineers, perfected in 1973 through a 
series of prototyping and proving test, and 
used proficiently on all Delta launch pads 
through the decade since that time, RLE has 
brought to launch processing of liquid 
rocket stages a new dimension of leak-free 
certainty. (Figures -8- and -9-)
The principle of operation is simple 
(refer to Figure -10-). A tracer gas is 
injected into venicle systems. Helium is 
used because of its safety and mobility. 
The exterior of each rocket system to be 
tested is laced with a harness of 1/8 11 
nylon tubules, one for each possible leak 
address, and a few for general area 
detection. These are numbered and brought 
in harness form off the launch vehicle into
an array at the top of a low pressure box. 
A vacuum pump maintains the internal 
pressure of tnis "scavenge box" 
substantially below atmospheric' pressure.
As a result, a steady flow of ambient air 
proceeds into the open end of the tubules 
and toward the scavenge box. Over the open 
end of each tubule a   loose envelope of 
foil, usually aluminum, is formed around 
the joint to be leak tested. The launch 
pad area is cleared of personnel, and the 
rocket systems are brought to full flight 
pressure with pure helium or a 
helium-nitrogen mixture. Helium molecules 
that escape the joints are swept up by 
incoming air and carried off toward the 
scavenge box through- the tubules. Inside 
the box is an addressing mechanism which 
positions the probe of a high vacuum helium 
detection device -- sequentially or on 
command -- at the injecting point of eacn 
tubule. Output is in the form of a mass 
spectrometer quantitative indication of 
parts per million of helium. Control of 
the addressing, dwell time, recording and 
evaluation of detected leakage is 
concentrated at a console in the 
blockhouse. System accuracy is greater 
than needed and periodic self-calibration 
is provided by known internal calibrated 
leaks (0.06, 0.6, 1.0, 8.0 SCCM). The 
system is able to detect leaks far below 
the level of significance for Delta systems 
and far below the level detectable by 
bubble soap and the human eye.
In the ten years of use, while there 
have been some infrequent machine startup 
and calibration problems, RLE has not been 
known to fail in detection of a launch 
vehicle leak to which it was exposed.
BAS: Loading propellants in the Delta 
second stage is not done entirely 
remotely. It is accomplished in the final 
days before flight. The propellants, 
nitrogen tetroxide and Aerozine 50, are 
highly toxic. To be quite certain the load 
is locked aboard without leakage and to 
minimize vehicle weight, fly-away quick 
disconnects are not used. All nose 
connections and disconnections, as well as 
final load adjustments are made by men at 
the rocket side. The propellants are 
driven aloft to the second stage by 
pressurization of trailer-mounted storage 
tanks. While this operation is controlled 
by switches from the blockhouse, certain 
valve settings as well as confirmations of 
flow, sightglass levels and scale poise 
conditions, require men at the storage 
units. Means co protect these men 
completely in an envelope of clean, fresh 
air is necessary wnen nandling tne nignly 
toxic Delta second stage propellants.
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First use of tne standard, liquid air 
pack, "SCAPE" suits at the Delta complex at 
Vanglenberg AFB produced cm lied and 
fatigued workers. Medical qualifications 
to use these suits involved stress testing 
wnicn only a portion of the rather "senior" 
corps of McDonnell Douglas tecnnicians on 
the Delta Program could pass. Crew-suited 
time was limited, requiring a full 
complement relief crew to oe utilized for 
each propellanc loading operation. In the 
small contingent Delta launch team these 
requirements posed economic as well as 
nazard and discomfort factors. In 
addition, Delta launches from the 
California location required the transport 
of a SCAPE suit support group, plus 
equipment, across tne continent for each 
mission. For the cost of one such mission, 
the BAS (Breathing Air System) was designed 
by McDonnell Douglas and built by launch 
site technicians out of surplus SCAPE suits.
Tne original BAS utilized a trailer of 
Del Monox diving air filters to purify the 
output of an ordinary construction site, 
diesel air compressor (Figure -12-). Tnis 
crailer was equipped with a carbon monoxi'de 
sensor and alarm system. Its output fed a 
system of manifolds and noses aoout tne 
launch complex from which, at distribution 
points, suited workers took their air 
supply via hoses. Into the surplus SCAPE 
suits McDonnell Douglas engineers designed 
changes; liquid air packs were removed; 
hose attacnments were mounted at waist 
level and tied into the internal 
distrioution system; vortex tubes of small 
dimensions and no moving parts were 
incorporated to sort not from cold incoming 
air molecules for the user to adjust his 
own temperature; an emergency egress 
air-bottle attachment was incorporated; and 
finally communications were installed in 
the helmets to make them compatible with 
the launch pad nets. The rework was 
accomplished in contract scope by McDonnell 
Douglas technicians. These suits were 
tried and found to offer a much lower 
fatigue and stress level to the user and to 
offer an economic oonus over tne original 
SCAPE suits, now referred to as Category I 
SCAPE. On the California Delta launch 
complex these suits have remained in use 
for twelve years. In the first drop 
testing of the Snuttle at NASA's Dryden 
Center, these suits were borrowed, together 
with tneir supporting air filtration 
system, and found to oe satisfactory in 
servicing Shuttle hypergolic propellants. 
This type of suit protection was recognized 
with a new NASA name: Category IV SCAPE 
and is now in wide service on STS. Delta 
operations at KSC were converted to this 
system in 1981, and maintenance of the 
suits is now accomplished by McDonnell 
Douglas at low cost.
QUIPU: This system, named for tne earliest 
of computation systems (tne Inca Indian set 
of knotted strings pronounced: "kee-poo") 
was a combination of HP1000 computer and 
Gould nigh speed jet printer with a set of 
CRT monitors and telemetry/land line 
instrumentation coming, primarily from 
launch vehicle systems (Figure -14-). It 
was designed and built in 1974, again to 
produce an efficiency and an effectiveness 
in launch preparation testing and a care in 
data handling. It is, in effect, an 
automated data engineer. QUIPU coverts all 
data instantly to engineering units, a 
great saving of engineering time. 
Superimposed on the unsophisticated Delta 
"finger-and-switch" ground test control 
system, it operates to monitor redlines 
during tests and to read and summarize test 
results rapidly. Redlines and operating 
limits are changed progressively in 
synchronism with system condition. QUIPU's 
benefit has been to confirm the 
acceptability quickly after a day of 
testing, somewhat relieving, out not 
entirely replacing, the long hours of 
reading strip cnarts and data analysis, 
which earlier held launch engineers into 
the nignt. QUPIU monitors differences on 
selected parameters through the succession 
of tests and helps detect degradation 
trends of transducers, should they occur.
SUMMARY
Material presented in this paper 
outlines the holistic approach to field 
operations whicn grew out of lessons in 
disaster and which has been used with good 
results on the Delta Program for more than 
a decade. Change was effected not alone in 
methods and instruments of planning, 
performing and documenting field 
operations, not alone in the structure and 
fit of paper systems to ma*<e them most 
effective, and not alone in the disciplines 
of test and assembly operations, nor in the 
equipments and instruments of taking and 
preserving data. Changes were made in all 
of these. They were harmonious changes, 
striving toward a common goal of focussed, 
effective processing with least confusion, 
least repeat, least damage, and least 
oversight.
The nolistic approach, tried and tested 
a decade with Delta, is recommended for 
other large launch programs or large field 
undertakings.
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